Ātmā as the locus of resolution

After having a small diverted topic of sādhana, yamaraja brings back the main topic about the nature of ātmā, presenting ātmā as sṛṣṭi-sthiti-laya-kāraṇam – the principle from which the world arises, by which the world is sustained and to which the world resolves.

yasya brahma ca kṣatram ca ubhe bhavata odanaḥ |

mṛtyuryasyopasecanam ka itthā veda yatra saḥ ||1.2.25||

For that (ātmā), both brāhmaṇa and kṣatriya are rice. Death is a side dish for that

(ātmā). In this manner, who would know where the ātmā is?

When ātmā is presented as the source of creation (sṛṣṭi), the sustainer (sthiti), and the ground of resolution (laya), it implies that everything here is ātmā alone. As the source of creation, ātmā doesn’t undergo any change to become the world; ātma continues to exist while sustaining every name and form; even when the entire world is resolved, ātmā alone is there. It amounts to saying that all along there is only one ātmā. The entire jagad is just a manifestation of name and form, which has no independent existence (mithyā) apart from ātmā. Just as gold remains gold even when appearing as various ornaments, or as clay remains clay despite taking various pot-forms, ātmā remains untouched while appearing as the world (satyam).

In this mantra, yamaraja focuses on ātmā as the laya-sthānam - locus of resolution, which swallows the whole creation at the time of pralaya - resolution of the world. yasya brahma ca kṣatram ca ubhe bhavata odanaḥ - both brāhmaṇa and kṣatriya are rice (main food) for ātmā, which means the world is resolved into ātmā at the time of resolution. Brāhmaṇa and kṣatriya here represent the entire world, because the world is sustained by dharma, and brāhmaṇa are people who lives a dharmic life and teaching dharma, and kṣatriya who are upholding dharma by maintaining laws and orders.

mṛtyuryasyopasecanam - death is the side dish for ātmā. Death means the time principle, which is an integral part of creation, and it resolves together with the world into ātmā. As part of creation, the origination of creation is also the origination of time. Therefore, one can never logically say when the creation came into being; it is the same as saying when time came into being, because it assumes time existed before time — a logical contradiction. Therefore, the universe is anirvacanīyam - logically inexplicable. Similarly, one cannot logically say where space exists or how it came into being.

ka itthā veda yatra saḥ - in this manner, who knows where this self is present? The question of where is ātmā and where does ātmā go after death is invalid, because ātmā doesn't “go” anywhere — it is all-pervading.

In summary, creation, along with time and space, arises from ātmā and ultimately resolves back into ātmā. Just as a side dish accompanies a main dish but does not exist independently, time and space are incidental to creation and have no independent reality apart from ātmā. When ātmā swallows the entire creation together with time and space, it means that ātmā transcends them. ātmā is not in time and space; rather, time and space are in ātmā. Hence, one should never wonder where ātmā goes after the death of the body. ātmā is not bound by birth or death of the body. It exists before the body arises, it remains during the life of the body, and it continues even after the body perishes. That is the principle that survive the body, as the answer to naciketa’s question.

By this answer of yamaraja, end the second section of the first chapter.

THIRD SECTION

The second section presented śreyas (jñāna) and preyas (karma) having diverse and opposite results, where śreyas gives the result of moksa and preyas gives the result of samsāra. But these two paths together with their results were not elaborated. Thus, for the ascertainment, the imaginary in the form of a metaphor is presented in this third section for easy understanding. With the help of the metaphor of a chariot, the clear distinction between jivātmā and paramātmā is made.

ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke guhām praviṣṭau parame parārdhe |

chāyātapau brahmavido vadanti pañcāgnayo ye ca triṇāciketāḥ ||1.3.1||

The knowers of brahman say (that jīvātmā and paramātmā), which are like shadow

and light, have entered the intellect, which is the exalted abode of brahman,

experiencing the result of their own actions in the body. Those who invoke the five

fires and who invoke the nāciketa-fire thrice (also say so).

chāyātapau brahmavido vadanti - the knowers of brahman speak of jīvātmā and paramātmā as being like shadow and light, which have different features. jivātmā, which is compared to a shadow having the dependent reality (mithyā), is bound. And paramātmā, which is compared to light, is free and independent in nature (satyam). They are not just discussed by the knowers of brahman in jñāna-kanda, but also by pañcāgnayo ye - those householder who invoke five types of fire, ca triṇāciketāḥ - and those who perform nāciketa-fire three times.

guhām praviṣṭau - jīvātmā and paramātmā being obtained in the intellect, which is compared to a cave, where the darkness of ignorance covers the true nature of paramātmā. Yet this place is parame parārdhe - an exalted abode of brahman, because in the intellect alone, the highest brahman is recognised as “I”.

Both jīvātmā and paramātmā ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke - experience the result of their own karma in the body. In here, the result of karma is called ṛtam - truth because it is inevitable/unavoidable, just like truth. Even though the experiencer is the jīvātmā alone, because of the presence of paramātmā, jīvātmā is there to experience; thus, it is said in the mantra that both of them experience. Another explanation by sankarācarya is by the analogy of an umbrella holder. During the rainy day, we see people on the street with umbrellas, and we say “everyone is going with an umbrella on the street”, even though some are without an umbrella.

The true nature of jīvātmā is paramātmā alone, because of false identification with upādhi, the status of being individual is also false (mithyā). Mithyā couldn’t exist without satyam; therefore, whenever jīvātmā is there, paramātmā is also there. Therefore there are two identities as though.